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Next-generation sequencing (NGS) analysis has emerged as a promising molecular epidemiological method for investigating
health care-associated outbreaks. Here, we used NGS to investigate a 3-year outbreak of multidrug-resistant Acinetobacter bau-
mannii (MDRAB) at a large academic burn center. A reference genome from the index case was generated using de novo assem-
bly of PacBio reads. Forty-six MDRAB isolates were analyzed by pulsed-field gel electrophoresis (PFGE) and sequenced using an
Illumina platform. After mapping to the index case reference genome, four samples were excluded due to low coverage, leaving
42 samples for further analysis. Multilocus sequence types (MLST) and the presence of acquired resistance genes were also deter-
mined from the sequencing data. A transmission network was inferred from genomic and epidemiological data using a Bayesian
framework. Based on single-nucleotide variant (SNV) differences, this MDRAB outbreak represented three sequential outbreaks
caused by distinct clones. The first and second outbreaks were caused by sequence type 2 (ST2), while the third outbreak was
caused by ST79. For the second outbreak, the MLST and PFGE results were discordant. However, NGS-based SNV typing de-
tected a recombination event and consequently enabled a more accurate phylogenetic analysis. The distribution of resistance
genes varied among the three outbreaks. The first- and second-outbreak strains possessed a blaOXA-23-like group, while the third-
outbreak strains harbored a blaOXA-40-like group. NGS-based analysis demonstrated the superior resolution of outbreak trans-
mission networks for MDRAB and provided insight into the mechanisms of strain diversification between sequential outbreaks
through recombination.
Health care-associated infections (HAI) are a substantial causeof morbidity and mortality in acute-care hospitals (1). Acin-
etobacter baumannii is an important opportunistic pathogen caus-
ing HAI (2) and has become one of the most common colonizing
pathogens in burn patients (3, 4). A. baumannii may cause serious
outbreaks despite the implementation of rigorous infection pre-
vention interventions and control measures, which occur most
commonly in intensive care units (5–8). Furthermore, the emer-
gence of multidrug-resistant A. baumannii (MDRAB), especially
carbapenem-resistant A. baumannii (CRAB), has become a global
concern (5, 9). Patients infected by multidrug-resistant Acineto-
bacter strains are likely to have higher mortality rates and longer
lengths of hospitalization than those infected by susceptible
strains (10).
Pulsed-field gel electrophoresis (PFGE) has been the gold stan-
dard approach for bacterial strain typing in hospital outbreak in-
vestigations, but several disadvantages have been described, in-
cluding that it is a time-consuming, labor-intensive, and
technically demanding assay and that is has limited reproducibil-
ity among laboratories; also, the interpretation of the relative re-
latedness of strains using this method may be discordant and sub-
jective (11–13). For these reasons, next-generation sequencing
(NGS) has emerged as a promising molecular epidemiology
method in investigations of health care-associated outbreaks (13).
A comparative analysis of single-nucleotide variants (SNVs) in
bacterial genomes provides valuable insights into genomic diver-
sity and evolution (e.g., determining the relatedness among epi-
demiologically linked strains and tracking bacterial strains of in-
terest) (13–15).
Our hospital experienced a prolonged hospital outbreak of
MDRAB, mainly among burn patients, which occurred over a
3-year period. Although sequential hospital outbreaks of MDRAB
have been reported (16–22), there are very few studies that apply
NGS for MDRAB strain typing in this setting. Here, we describe
the molecular investigation of this outbreak, showing that this
actually represents several sequential outbreaks within the burn
unit. Strain typing by PFGE and NGS was conducted on 46 patient
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isolates from the course of the outbreak, and NGS data were used
to build a transmission network, explore the genetic relatedness of
these outbreaks, and understand drug resistance patterns.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Ethics statement. This retrospective study was approved by the institu-
tional review board (IRB) of the University of North Carolina (UNC) at
Chapel Hill (IRB no. 06-0437).
Bacterial isolates. We analyzed a total of 46 clinical isolates of
MDRAB, which were collected from sequential outbreaks that occurred
between 2007 and 2010 at UNC Hospitals (Chapel Hill, NC, USA), an
853-bed tertiary care academic facility (41 isolates from the North Caro-
lina Jaycee Burn Center, Chapel Hill, NC). This represents 54% (46/85) of
the nonduplicate isolates collected in this period. A single isolate from the
primary site of infection or colonization was used for each patient (Table
1). Acinetobacter species were identified from clinical specimens collected
from these sites using standard protocols within UNC’s McLendon Clin-
ical Laboratories. Antimicrobial susceptibility testing was performed for
clinical isolates from each patient according to the Clinical and Labora-
tory Standards Institute guidelines (55), and the antimicrobial suscepti-
bility profiles are shown in Table S1 in the supplemental material. A.
baumannii strains were considered to be multidrug resistant if they met
the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) criteria for
MDRAB (i.e., were intermediate or resistant to at least 1 drug in 3 of the 6
following classes: extended-spectrum cephalosporins, fluoroquinolones,
aminoglycosides, carbapenems, piperacillin or piperacillin-tazobactam,
and ampicillin-sulbactam) (2).
Patient information. Comprehensive hospital-wide surveillance for
HAI is conducted at UNC using a laboratory-based approach verified
through chart review. HAI were prospectively ascertained using the
CDC definitions (23); the surveillance data were entered into an elec-
tronic database.
Pulsed-field gel electrophoresis. PFGE was performed on a 1% PFGE
agarose gel with a CHEF-DR II system (Bio-Rad Laboratories, Richmond,
CA, USA) using the SmaI restriction enzyme (New England BioLabs, Inc.,
Ipswich, MA, USA). Relatedness among Acinetobacter strains was deter-
mined as described previously (24).
Next-generation sequencing. Bacterial isolates were grown overnight
in LB broth at 37°C. DNA from each isolate was extracted and purified
using an UltraClean microbial DNA isolation kit (Mo Bio, Carlsbad, CA).
Sequencing libraries were prepared using the Nextera XT library prep kit
(Illumina, San Diego, CA) with indexed adapters, according to the man-
ufacturer’s instructions. This approach uses a modified transposase to
prepare an adapter-ligated sequencing library. All short-read libraries
were pooled and sequenced on a single Illumina MiSeq run, using 150-
base paired-end chemistry at the UNC High-Throughput Sequencing Fa-
cility, Chapel Hill, NC.
In order to provide a reference genome specific for this outbreak
against which to compare other isolates, we defined the isolate with the
earliest detection date as the outbreak index case (A. baumannii strain
A03). A whole-genome long-read sequencing library was prepared for the
PacBio RSII system and was run on two single-molecule real-time
(SMRT) cells (Pacific Biosciences, Menlo Park, CA) at the UNC High-
Throughput Sequencing Facility.
Sequence assembly and mapping. PacBio sequencing reads were as-
sembled de novo into an outbreak reference genome using Hierarchical
Genome Assembly Process (HGAP) 2.0, part of the SMRT Analysis ver-
sion 2.3 software package (PacBio, Menlo Park, CA), deployed on the
Amazon Elastic Cloud (EC2). Illumina reads from all samples were then
mapped to the PacBio-generated outbreak reference genome using bwa-
mem reference-guided assembly (25). We then applied GATK version 3.3
(26) indel realignment and removed duplicate sequences. After sequence
mapping, 4 of the 46 isolates were excluded from further analysis, because
these isolates had low genome-wide coverage when aligned to the index
case reference genome (see Fig. S1 in the supplemental material), leaving
42 isolates for further analysis. Using short reads from all samples, species
identification was confirmed using Kraken (27).
Variant calling. SNV discovery was performed by simultaneously ap-
plying the GATK UnifiedGenotyper across all reference-aligned MDRAB
isolates. Variants were filtered stringently using cutoffs responsive to the
underlying distribution of quality scores. The following parameters were
used for filtering: quality-by-depth, 20; mapping quality, 55; Fisher
score,10; map quality rank sum,5.0 or higher; and read position rank
sum,5.0 or higher. In addition, only genomic positions with at least 5
coverage in 100% of the isolates were used for further comparative anal-
ysis.
Genetic analysis. Acquired resistance genes were identified using Res-
Finder version 2.1 (28), with a threshold of 95% identity and a minimum
length of 40% on unaligned sequencing reads. Multilocus sequence typing
(MLST) was performed, and sequence types (STs) were determined from
the unaligned sequence data using MLST version 1.7 (29) and the Pasteur
MLST database (http://pubmlst.org/abaumannii) (30, 31). eBURST anal-
yses were performed under stringent (minimum of six shared alleles)
grouping parameters using eBURST version 3 (32), based on STs identi-
fied from the Pasteur scheme, to investigate evolutionary relationships
between the founder and the other STs. Each clonal complex (CC) was
formed by the founder ST and its single-locus variants (30). Recombina-
tion analysis was undertaken using Gubbins (33). Potential blocks of hor-
izontal gene transfer were identified by at least three base substitutions,
and recombinogenic regions were masked during construction of a max-
imum-likelihood phylogenetic tree, using RAxML (34). Additionally, a
neighbor-joining tree was constructed on the basis of SNVs from the core
mapped genome and bootstrapped 100 times in R using the phangorn and
ape softwares (35, 36). A corresponding map representing genome-wide
SNVs was calculated in R using the adegenet software (37). Variants were
also used to calculate principal component analysis using adegenet (see
Fig. S2 in the supplemental material). Bayesian transmission chain recon-
struction was performed in R using the outbreaker software (38). Case
infectivity probability density followed a log-normal distribution, with 
of 0.8 andof 3 (see Fig. S3 and S4 in the supplemental material). Inferred
transmission chains were then used to inform mutation rate calculations
(see Fig. S5 in the supplemental material). Pairwise FST (a fixation index
indicating the degree of shared alleles) between outbreaks was calculated
in R using PopGenome (39) and visualized using circlize (40).
Nucleotide sequence accession numbers. All sequence data reported
in this study are deposited at the DDBJ/EMBL/GenBank Sequence Read
Archive (SRA) under the accession numbers DRX029904 to DRX029951
(short reads for A01 to A48), DRX029952 (long reads for A03, the index
case), and DRZ007436 (A03 long-read reference sequence). See Table 1
for the accession numbers.
RESULTS
The epidemiological and clinical characteristics of patients with
MDRAB infection or colonization in the sequential outbreaks are
provided in Fig. 1 and Table 1. The cases included 34 (74%) pa-
tients with burns, 6 (13%) patients with toxic epidermal necrolysis
or Stevens-Johnson syndrome, and 6 patients with other diseases
(13%). Thirty-four of the 46 patients (74%) were diagnosed with
more than one HAI, including respiratory tract infections (n 
25), bloodstream infections (n 8), urinary tract infections (n
8), surgical site infections (n  1), and other infections (n  8).
Twenty-three patients (50%) died during their hospitalization.
For the long-read de novo reference assembly of the first-out-
break index case (A03), two PacBio SMRT cells yielded a total of
92,781 postfiltered reads, with an N50 of 21,638. After de novo
assembly, the resulting reference genome was composed of 31
contigs with a maximum contig length of 2,128,013 bp, an N50 of
698,352 bp, and a total genome size of 4,461,520 bp. Illumina
short reads for 46 isolates produced an average of 615,000 read
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TABLE 1 Epidemiological and clinical characteristics of patients with multidrug-resistant A. baumannii infection or colonization in the sequential
outbreaks
Strain
IDa Specimen sourceb
Accession
no.
Age range
(yr) Sexc Outcome Underlying diseased HAIe Type of HAIf
A01 BAL fluid DRX029904 60–69 M Died 60% TBSA burn Yes RTI
A02 Blood DRX029905 60–69 F Died 30% TBSA burn No
A03 Tracheal aspirate DRX029906 40–49 M Died 60% TBSA burn Yes UTI
A04 Catheter tip DRX029907 10–19 M Survived 60% TBSA burn Yes RTI
A05 Tracheal aspirate DRX029908 40–49 F Died 50% TBSA burn Yes RTI, other
A06 Swab (back wound) DRX029909 30–39 F Died 43% TBSA burn Yes RTI, UTI, other
A07 Urine DRX029910 30–39 F Died Meningococcal sepsis Yes RTI
A08 Autopsy, myocardium DRX029911 60–69 M Died 60% TBSA burn Yes RTI
A09 Throat DRX029912 40–49 M Survived 10% TBSA burn No
A10 BAL fluid DRX029913 50–59 F Survived 26% TBSA burn Yes RTI, UTI, other
A11 Sputum DRX029914 60–69 M Died 35% TBSA burn No
A12 Throat DRX029915 20–29 M Survived Inhalation injury without
cutaneous burn
Yes RTI
A13 Tracheal aspirate DRX029916 40–49 M Survived 25% TBSA burn Yes RTI
A14 BAL fluid DRX029917 50–59 M Survived 17% TBSA burn Yes RTI
A15 Urine DRX029918 80–89 M Survived Withdrawal from benzodiazepines
complicated by aspiration
pneumonia
No
A16 Drainage (pus from nose) DRX029919 20–29 F Died 12.5% TBSA burn Yes UTI
A17 Swab (surface) DRX029920 50–59 M Died End-stage liver disease, admit for
liver transplantation
Yes SSI
A18 Swab (surface) DRX029921 70–79 M Survived Stevens-Johnson syndrome with
TENS
No
A19 Swab (thigh) DRX029922 40–49 M Survived 22% total surface area
full-thickness burn
No
A20 Tracheal aspirate DRX029923 50–59 F Survived 8% TBSA burn Yes RTI
A21 Sputum DRX029924 0–9 M Survived 25% TBSA burn Yes RTI
A22 Tracheal aspirate DRX029925 70–79 M Died 47% TBSA 2nd/3rd degree burn Yes RTI
A23 Swab (axilla) DRX029926 60–69 M Survived 18% burn No
A24 Catheter tip DRX029927 40–49 M Survived 75% TBSA 2nd/3rd degree burn No
A25 Sputum DRX029928 60–69 M Died Hepatic lobe wedge resection for
septic embolism
Yes UTI
A26 Tracheal aspirate DRX029929 0–9 M Survived 60% TBSA burn Yes RTI
A27 Catheter tip DRX029930 50–59 F Died Stevens-Johnson syndrome Yes Other
A28 Swab (axilla) DRX029931 40–49 M Survived 9% TBSA burn No
A29 Urine DRX029932 40–49 M Died 72% TBSA burn Yes RTI, UTI, other
A30 Swab (leg) DRX029933 50–59 M Survived 22% TBSA burn Yes RTI
A31 Swab (thigh) DRX029934 40–49 F Survived 61% TBSA burn Yes RTI, other
A32 Swab (abdomen) DRX029935 20–29 M Survived Pyoderma gangrenosum No
A33 Swab (thigh) DRX029936 50–59 F Died Stevens-Johnson syndrome No
A34 Swab (leg) DRX029937 30–39 F Survived 63% TBSA burn Yes BSI, RTI
A35 Tracheal aspirate DRX029938 40–49 F Died TENS Yes RTI
A36 Sputum DRX029939 80–89 F Died Ventral hernia repair, sepsis Yes BSI, RTI
A37 Swab (back wound) DRX029940 50–59 M Died 45% TBSA burn Yes RTI
A38 Throat DRX029941 50–59 F Died 40% TBSA burn Yes UTI, BSI, RTI, other
A39 Blood DRX029942 30–39 M Died 50% TBSA burn Yes BSI, RTI, UTI, other
A40 Throat DRX029943 60–69 M Survived 18% TBSA burn Yes RTI
A41 Catheter tip DRX029944 70–79 F Survived TENS Yes BSI
A42 Throat DRX029945 40–49 M Survived 35% TBSA burn Yes BSI
A43 Swab (chest) DRX029946 30–39 F Died Stevens-Johnson syndrome Yes BSI
A45 Throat DRX029948 80–89 M Survived Inhalational injury No
A46 Blood DRX029949 40–49 M Died 30% TBSA burn Yes BSI
A48 Swab (neck) DRX029951 70–79 M Died 19% TBSA burn Yes RTI
a ID, identification.
b BAL, bronchoalveolar lavage.
c M, male; F, female.
d TBSA, total body surface area; TENS, toxic epidermal necrolysis.
e HAI, health care-associated infection.
f RTI, respiratory tract infection; UTI, urinary tract infection; SSI, surgical site infection; BSI, bloodstream infection.
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pairs per isolate. Kraken metagenomic sequence classification
confirmed that all 46 sequenced isolates were A. baumannii. After
reference-guided assembly to the A03 index case genome, four of
46 A. baumannii alignments did not reach10 coverage at 40%
of the reference genome (see Fig. S1 in the supplemental material)
and were excluded from further analysis. Among the remaining 42
isolates, 41 isolates had60% of the genome accessible for variant
calling with at least 5 coverage. Variant calling identified 35,551
high-quality single-nucleotide variants that were used for NGS-
based analysis.
NGS-based SNV typing suggests these sequential MDRAB out-
breaks over a 3-year period were caused by three clones with dis-
tinct genetic backgrounds; the first outbreak of 13 isolates origi-
nated with A03 (August 2007 to November 2008), the second
outbreak of 3 isolates originated with A15 (June 2008 to August
2009), and the third outbreak of 24 isolates originated with A20
(August 2008 to March 2011) (Fig. 2; see also Fig. S6 in the sup-
plemental material). Within each of these outbreak clusters, the
samples did not vary by27 SNVs (see Fig. S7 in the supplemental
material). The mean mutation rates (95% confidence interval
[CI]) of the MDRAB strains in the first and third outbreaks were
estimated to be 10.2 mutations (7.2 to 24.5 mutations) and 27.1
mutations (5.3 to 139.4 mutations) per genome per year, respec-
tively (see Fig. S5 in the supplemental material). This is in line with
previous findings that the estimated rate of SNV accumulation in
A. baumannii strains was approximately 2 to 10 mutations per
year (13, 14). Modeling of genetic differences between the 42
genotyped infections/colonizations predicted that half of all
infections/colonizations were sampled (see Fig. S4 in the sup-
plemental material), which corresponds well with epidemio-
logical data (42/85 infections/colonizations were sequenced
and used for analysis).
NGS-based SNV typing showed that two strains (A32 and A42)
collected during the outbreak period were not related to these
sequential outbreaks and likely represent sporadic cases within the
burn unit. Interestingly, the second outbreak (strains A15, A25,
and A36) represents a strain that likely underwent recombination
with the strain responsible for the initial outbreak and an addi-
tional strain that was not found among the isolates we sampled
(Fig. 2; see also Fig. S8 in the supplemental material). There was
89.6% identity between A15 (second outbreak) and A18 (first out-
break) (3,687 differences/35,551 SNVs). Moreover, the SNVs that
differentiate the first outbreak from the second outbreak are clus-
tered in a few recombination events, with the vast majority of
these variants (3,481/3,687 variants [94.4%]) occurring in a single
697,976-nucleotide recombination block (11.8% of the genome).
The majority of the remaining variants were also clustered into
recombination blocks.
FIG1 Timeline of sequential outbreaks caused by multidrug-resistant Acinetobacter baumannii. BICU, burn intensive care unit; ISCU, intermediate surgical care
unit; MICU, medicine intensive care unit; NSIU, neuroscience intensive care unit; SICU, surgery intensive care unit; CCU, coronary care unit; PICU, pediatric
intensive care unit; CTSU, cardiothoracic stepdown unit; MPCU, medicine progressive care unit; floor, general ward. Each case corresponds to a case described
in Table 1. The numbers (1, 2, and 3) designate the outbreak to which an isolate is predicted to belong.
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A comparison of the NGS-based SNV typing data to the MLST
and PFGE data is shown in Fig. 2. The sequenced MDRAB strains
represented 3 STs, including 14 strains belonging to ST2, 23
strains of ST79, 1 strain of ST108, and 4 strains of unknown ST.
The first and second outbreaks were caused by ST2. In the second
outbreak, A25, which was classified as unknown due to coverage
reasons, had eight SNV differences compared to A36 and three
SNV differences compared to A15, both of which belong to ST2.
In contrast, the third outbreak was led by ST79. PFGE differenti-
ated the 42 isolates into 13 types. Of them, 2b, 2c, 2d, and 2e were
categorized as being closely related to 2a, and 5b, 5c, and 5d were
closely related to 5a by PFGE using the Tenover et al. criteria (24).
However, the three strains from the second outbreak (A15, A25,
and A36, which were highly similar by SNV typing) were classified
into different strains by PFGE. Furthermore, PFGE showed some
isolates to be closely related, with 2 to 3 band differences, despite
no SNV difference between two strains (e.g., A3 and A9, and A19
and A20).
The Bayesian transmission network of the 42 MDRAB strains
in sequential outbreaks is provided in Fig. 3. Most transmission
events in the outbreaks were predicted with a high degree of cer-
tainty (posterior probabilities near 1.0) and may represent direct
transmissions, given their genetic relatedness (see Fig. S7 in the
supplemental material) and timeline (Fig. 1). In contrast, there
was uncertainty with respect to certain transmission events during
the first outbreak (A08, A17, and A18) and the third outbreak
(A21 to A23, A26, A27, A34, and A40), with posterior probabilities
for the numerous potential transmission scenarios of 0.5. Al-
though these exact transmission events were difficult to predict,
these strains, except A17, shared ward space (burn intensive care
unit [BICU]) and were closely grouped in time and genetic dis-
tance, suggesting epidemiologic connections between the isolates.
Although A42 and some strains from the third outbreak (e.g., A34,
A41, and A48) shared the same place (BICU) and time (Fig. 1),
both NGS-based SNV typing and PFGE typing uncovered pro-
found unrelatedness between A42 and strains of the third out-
break. The three isolates that comprised the second outbreak
(A15, A25, and A36) had no direct mutual contact, despite con-
vincing genetic relatedness by typing, possibly due to transmission
through environmental or unsampled sources. A15 did not share
a location with any other cases in this study but may have had
contact with contaminated environment or health care personnel
who cared for cases from the first outbreak, as some of these cases
(e.g., A10, A14, and A18) were transferred outside the BICU. The
SNV differences between A15 and strains from the first outbreak
suggest that gene transfer may have occurred between the strain
responsible for the first outbreak and another MDRAB strain
within the hospital. In addition, A36 from the second outbreak
shared a location (surgery intensive care unit [SICU]) and time
with A37 from the third outbreak, but these strains were highly
genetically divergent from one another.
Thirty-eight MDRAB isolates from this study belonged to
three different STs (ST2, ST79, and ST108), while the STs of 4
strains remained undetermined. The eBURST analysis based on
the Pasteur MLST scheme revealed that these 38 MDRAB strains
belonged to two A. baumannii CCs (CC2 and CC79), while ST108
FIG 2 Maximum-likelihood (ML) phylogram (left) and recombination map (center) show relatedness between outbreak isolates. The ML phylogeny was
constructed from genetic variation in nonrecombinant genomic regions. Recombination events were inferred from the 30,000 variants identified among
individual isolates. In the horizontal tracks, each column represents a single nucleotide in the reference genome, and each row represents an individual clinical
isolate. Red blocks mark recombination events occurring on an internal branch of the phylogeny, while blue blocks mark potential recombination events or
extensive mutations occurring on a terminal node. Pasteur MLST and PFGE types are included in the first and second columns on the right, respectively.
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was a singleton (see Fig. S9 in the supplemental material). Four-
teen MDRAB isolates (ST2) belonged to CC2, corresponding with
international clone II, for which ST2 was the founder (9, 41). The
remaining 23 MDRAB isolates (ST79) belonged to CC79, for
which ST79 was the founder.
The antimicrobial resistance genes in these 42 multidrug-resis-
tant A. baumannii strains are summarized in Table 2. Strains
from the first and second outbreaks possessed blaOXA-23-like
group and blaOXA-51-like group genes, while strains from the
third outbreak harbored blaOXA-40-like group and blaOXA-51-like
group genes. All isolates with blaOXA-23-like group genes were
blaOXA-23 and were classified into ST2 (except one isolate with an
undetermined ST). Similarly, all isolates with blaOXA-40-like group
genes were blaOXA-24 (renamed blaOXA-40) and were assigned to
ST79 (except one isolate with undetermined ST). One isolate (A42)
had the blaOXA-58 gene, belonging to the blaOXA-58-like group. The
isolates with blaOXA-51-like group genes included blaOXA-65, blaOXA-66,
blaOXA-75, blaOXA-92, blaOXA-116, and blaOXA-117. The distribution of
genes resistant to other antibiotics also varied among the three
outbreaks.
DISCUSSION
NGS-based analysis revealed transmission pathways during three
sequential outbreaks over a 3-year period, demonstrating the lon-
gevity of MDRAB strains in this health care setting and the diffi-
culty of infection control at a large academic burn center. Several
Acinetobacter outbreaks in burn units were described previously
and were partially associated with extensive environmental con-
tamination (42–45). A. baumannii survives in the hospital envi-
ronment for a prolonged period, even on dry surfaces and the
hands of health care personnel, and the carriage of MDRAB in
human hosts may also be prolonged (10, 46, 47), which can facil-
itate transmission and outbreaks of A. baumannii.
This study revealed some discrepancies between genotyping
methods. Isolates from the second outbreak (A15 and A36) were
from the same sequence type (ST2) as clones from the first out-
FIG 3 Bayesian reconstruction of transmission chains for all 42 multidrug-resistant A. baumannii outbreak isolates. The nodes are colored by isolate collection
date, and the node sizes are proportional to the number of inferred outward transmission events originating from each node. Vector direction (indicated by
arrows) reflects transmission sequence, and vector transparency indicates the degree of posterior support for the transmission link. Two distinct and successive
outbreaks are clearly seen. Three recombinant strains (A15, A25, and A36) branching from the earliest outbreak are seen. Additionally, there were no inferred
inward or outward transmission events for the two isolated non-outbreak strains (A32 and A42).
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break, despite there being a difference of 3,000 SNVs between
these outbreak strains. A recent study showed that unlike vanco-
mycin-resistant Enterococcus faecium and methicillin-resistant
Staphylococcus aureus, genomically identical A. baumannii isolates
might be misclassified as different by PFGE, leading to incorrectly
reconstructed transmission trees and an underestimation of the
true extent of A. baumannii outbreaks (13). A large-scale sequenc-
ing study of A. baumannii strains was more discriminatory than
MLST (48). These previous reports and the results from our study
suggest that for A. baumannii in particular, NGS-based SNV typ-
ing can more informatively distinguish strains than can MLST or
PFGE.
Our NGS-based analysis suggested that the second outbreak
occurred following a recombination event between a bacterium of
the first outbreak and an occult MDRAB clone that was likely
circulating within the hospital (Fig. 2; see also Fig. S8 in the sup-
plemental material). This is the first time that sequential out-
breaks within a single hospital have been reported in which the
second outbreak represents a recombinant with the original out-
break strain as a parent. Previously, several studies described that
A. baumannii hospital outbreaks can be polyclonal, and a variety
of recombination and horizontal gene transfer events occurred in
A. baumannii strains and contributed to the genetic diversity in
the microorganism, even among colonized patients (49–52). Hor-
izontal gene transfer that occurs between sampled and unsampled
A. baumannii isolates may explain discrepancies between NGS-
based SNV typing and PFGE typing results, as was seen here (13).
Global epidemic CCs of A. baumannii (e.g., international
clones I, II, and III), consisting of a subset of different STs, have
been described (9). ST2 harboring blaOXA-23 was the most fre-
quent in the first outbreak. blaOXA-23 was the most prevalent ac-
quired carbapenemase-encoding gene among A. baumannii
strains in many countries worldwide, including the United States,
especially among international clone II (9, 41, 53). ST79 strains
were introduced in the burn center and caused the third outbreak.
To our knowledge, this was a novel outbreak due to ST79 possess-
ing blaOXA-24/40, although blaOXA-24/40 was mostly detected among
CC2 (9). None of the MDRAB isolates belonged to ST10, which
has been associated with enhanced virulence among fatal outbreak
strains (54).
This study has several potential limitations. First, sequencing
failed to cover the complete genome of every isolate, which re-
duced the sensitivity of sequencing for detecting genetic variation
among strains. This uneven coverage is likely due to the trans-
posase-mediated library preparation approach used, which, de-
spite the lack of a strong GC or AT bias in the A. baumannii
genome, created libraries with genomic regions of high and low
read representation. In this scenario, additional sequencing runs
would not substantially increase coverage quality. Furthermore,
the sensitivity we observed for detecting genetic variation may
have been decreased, because we elected a conservative variant-
calling approach in which all SNVs had to meet a minimum cov-
erage depth in all isolates to be used for this study. Despite the
shortcoming of incomplete sequence coverage, the available data
enabled us to analyze 50% of the reference sequence space in
these isolates. Second, there were a few discrepancies between
NGS-based typing and PFGE typing. This might be explained by
(i) genetic variation occurring in genomic regions where we
achieved low sequence coverage, (ii) PFGE experiments being
performed on different gels, or (iii) horizontal gene transfer into
or out of isolates, which was not reflected in the reference genome.
To realize the full potential of NGS-based analysis, reference-free
methods that enable us to capture and represent the entire reper-
toire of genetic variation within and between samples should be
developed. Finally, our transmission network analysis is likely im-
pacted by isolates not detected or analyzed during the study. The
posterior probabilities of some transmission events are likely low
due to this issue.
In conclusion, our data support previous claims that NGS-
based SNV typing is superior to both MLST and PFGE for the
strain typing of A. baumannii. The use of this technique allowed us
to understand at a finer level the likely transmission dynamics of
the first outbreak within the hospital and to determine the nature
of sequential outbreaks more thoroughly, including the previ-
ously undescribed recombinant strain responsible for the second
outbreak. NGS-based analysis also allows for a better understand-
ing of underlying resistance genes among MDRAB strains. How-
ever, challenges remain for WGS, specifically the cost, complexity
of bioinformatic analysis, and lack of standard criteria for deter-
mining the number of genome variants that constitute an out-
break (13). Further WGS studies on hospital outbreak investiga-
tions and infection control are needed to help overcome these
challenges. WGS can provide valuable information concerning
the onset, course, and size of hospital outbreaks and can posit a
TABLE 2 Distribution of acquired antimicrobial resistance genes in 42 multidrug-resistant A. baumannii strains
Outbreak
(no. of strains) Strain ID(s)
Resistance gene type(s)
Aminoglycoside 	-Lactam(s) Sulfonamide Tetracycline Other
First (13) A1, A2, A3, A5, A7, A8, A9, A10,
A11, A14, A16, A17, A18
strA, strB, aac(3)-IIa,
aph(3=)-Ic, aph(3=)-Ic,
aph(3=)-Vla
blaOXA-23, blaOXA-65, blaOXA-66,
blaOXA-117, blaADC-25
sul2 tet(B)
Second (3) A15, A25, A36 strA, strB, aadA1, aac(3)-Ia,
aph(3=)-Ic
blaOXA-23, blaOXA-65, blaOXA-92,
blaADC-25, blaTEM-1D
sul1, sul2 tet(B)
Third (24) A19, A20, A21, A22, A23, A24,
A26, A27, A28, A29, A30,
A31, A33, A34, A35, A37,
A38, A39, A40, A41, A43,
A45, A46, A48
strA, strB, aac(3)-IIa blaOXA-24, blaOXA-65, blaOXA-75,
blaOXA-116, blaOXA-117,
blaADC-25, blaTEM-1B
sul2
Unrelated (1) A32 aadB, aph(3=)-VIa blaADC-25 sul1, sul2 msr(E), mph(E),
catB3
Unrelated (1) A42 aadA1, aadB, aph(3=)-Ic,
strA, strB
blaOXA-10, blaOXA-58, blaADC-25,
blaCARB-8
sul1, sul2 msr(E), mph(E),
floR, dfrA1
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transmission network. This information can help hospital epide-
miologists and infection preventionists design and implement
more efficient interventions for outbreak control.
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